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Abstract
Previous research has studied the relationship between political ideology and cognitive
biases, such as the tendency of conservatives to form stronger illusory correlations between
negative infrequent behaviors and minority groups. We further explored these findings by
studying the relation between illusory correlation and moral values. According to the moral
foundations theory, liberals and conservatives differ in the relevance they concede to differ-
ent moral dimensions: Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity. Whereas liberals con-
sistently endorse the Care and Fairness foundations more than the Loyalty, Authority and
Purity foundations, conservatives tend to adhere to the five foundations alike. In the present
study, a group of participants took part in a standard illusory correlation task in which they
were presented with randomly ordered descriptions of either desirable or undesirable
behaviors attributed to individuals belonging to numerically different majority and minority
groups. Although the proportion of desirable and undesirable behaviors was the same in the
two groups, participants attributed a higher frequency of undesirable behaviors to the minor-
ity group, thus showing the expected illusory correlation effect. Moreover, this effect was
specifically associated to our participants’ scores in the Loyalty subscale of the Moral Foun-
dations Questionnaire. These results emphasize the role of the Loyalty moral foundation in
the formation of attitudes towards minorities among conservatives. Our study points out the
moral system as a useful fine-grained framework to explore the complex interaction
between basic cognitive processes and ideology.
Introduction
According to the moral foundations theory [1], moral sensitivities can be structured around
five dimensions: the Care foundation refers to compassion and protection from damage; the
Fairness foundation relates to justice and views on how resources should be distributed; the
Loyalty foundation entails commitment to the group, emphasizing the differences between in-
group and out-group; the Authority foundation implies respect to hierarchy and attitudes
towards obedience and leadership; the Purity foundation is related to ideas of prevention from
physical or spiritual contamination. Care and Fairness are sometimes referred to as “individu-
alizing” foundations, because they highlight individuals as the locus of moral values. On the
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other hand, Loyalty, Authority and Purity are considered to be “binding” foundations because
they situate the focus of moral values onto groups.
Given the close relationship between moral intuitions and political inclinations, the moral
foundations theory has been applied to explore the interplay between moral values and ideol-
ogy, mainly focusing on the study of the liberal-conservative continuum. In many studies, lib-
erals and conservatives have been shown to differ in the relevance they concede to different
moral concerns [2–5]. Whereas liberals are known to concede more relevance to the individu-
alizing than to the binding foundations, conservatives rate the binding foundations as more
relevant than the liberals do, tending to adhere to the five foundations alike.
Differences in political perspectives have also been studied in relation to basic cognitive
processes. Specifically, the influence of cognitive biases over ideology has received certain
attention in the last years [6–9]. Cognitive biases are systematic errors in our reasoning that
make us draw flawed conclusions and make incorrect decisions [10]. Among these phenom-
ena, illusory correlation is of special interest from our perspective because it has been proposed
as a cognitive facilitator of the development of social prejudices [11,12], which are known to
be more frequent among conservatives than liberals [13–15].
Generally, illusory correlation denotes a tendency to overestimate the degree of covariation
between two variables. More specifically, distinctiveness-based illusory correlation [11] refers
to the predisposition to associate two relatively infrequent events in absence of real covaria-
tion. In a standard illusory correlation task, a volunteer is presented with sentences describing
either positive, socially desirable, or negative, socially undesirable, behaviors performed by
people from a fictitious majority or minority group. Although the ratio of positive to negative
behaviors is the same in the two groups (usually 2.25:1), the participants typically overestimate
the percentages of the less frequent dimension in the minority group and subjectively rate its
members according to that estimation. Thus, if undesirable behaviors are the less frequent
dimension, participants would end up considering members of the minority group to be less
likeable.
The effects observed with this experimental task in the laboratory have been linked to social
stereotype and prejudice formation in real-life environments. Human communities usually
comprise different social groups varying in size, and negative behaviors are typically less fre-
quent than positive ones. The cognitive tendency to associate the minority groups with less fre-
quent behaviors, even in well controlled situations in which the proportions of desirable and
undesirable behaviors are carefully matched, could be, at least in part, responsible for the
appearance of negative group stereotypes against social minorities in real life [12].
Illusory correlation effects have already been specifically associated to political views. In this
sense, Castelli and Carraro [16] showed that, compared to liberals, conservatives tend to
develop stronger illusory correlation effects when negative behaviors are the infrequent ones.
These effects were later replicated by the same group, and new data showed that they could be
observed, not only on explicit, but also on implicit attitudes towards the minority group [17].
As political ideology is closely related to the moral system, we consider that moral intuitions
might also be associated to cognitive processes like those underlying the illusory correlation
effect. Moreover, we believe that, compared to the liberal-conservative dimension, moral foun-
dations could provide a more fine-grained framework to understand the interplay between
basic cognitive functions and ideology.
The way in which previous authors have determined the political views of their participants
usually involves, to some extent, moral evaluation. For example, Castelli and Carraro [16]
determined their participants’ political position by asking them to report their level of agree-
ment with five different topics: reduction of immigration, medically assisted procreation,
homosexual marriage, use of arms for personal defense and adoption by homosexual couples.
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In this sense, previous studies have observed that opinions on these and other topics are specif-
ically predicted by differential endorsement of specific moral foundations. For example,
Koleva et al. [18] observed that Purity is the best predictor of attitudes towards same-sex mar-
riage whereas Care is the strongest predictor of support for gun control.
Hence, we believe that, by approaching the relationship between ideology and propensity to
develop illusory correlations from the perspective of the moral foundations theory, we can
more precisely determine which specific aspects of being a conservative or being a liberal are
related to the tendency to develop illusory correlations. That is, if conservatives differ from lib-
erals in the importance they give to different moral foundations, then it is possible that only
some of these foundations are significantly related with the illusory correlation effect. Our ini-
tial hypothesis is that endorsement of binding moral dimensions, typically more strongly pres-
ent in conservatives, will be positively related to illusory correlation effects, whereas intuitions
associated to individualizing moral foundations will not. As illusory correlation is closely
related to the generation and maintenance of prejudices and social stereotypes, we propose
that scores in the Loyalty foundation, which focuses on the distinction between in-group and
out-group members, will be the most important dimension of this association. Loyalty-related
moral concerns imply beliefs that members of one’s own group should be treated more favor-
ably than members of other groups. For instance, those who report higher Loyalty concerns
tend to favor in-group members, such as relatives, friends, neighbors or people from their
same sports team or country. From our perspective, the theoretical relevance of Loyalty in rela-
tion to in-group preference situates this foundation as a straightforward candidate to be in the
core of the association between conservatism and illusory correlation.
Methods
Participants
Data was gathered in two phases. In the first stage, an initial group of 132 volunteers took part
in the experiment. After preliminary analyses and following the reviewers advice on a previous
version of the manuscript, we increased the sample size up to 263 participants. They were all
students at the University of Barcelona who took part in the study in exchange of course cred-
its. Twenty-three students were excluded because they did not complete the three tasks, so the
final sample consisted of 240 volunteers (80% females, mean age 23.8, SD 4.47). The study was
conducted in Spanish. Data were gathered and analyzed anonymously. Prior to their participa-
tion in the study the participants were naïve to the topics of illusory correlation and moral
foundations. The study protocols were approved by the university’s ethics committee (Comis-
sio´ de Bioètica de la Universitat de Barcelona, CBUB) and written (on-line) informed consent
was obtained from all the volunteers prior to their participation in the study.
Procedure
The study consisted of three phases, the illusory correlation task, the moral foundations ques-
tionnaire and a political identity survey, which were conducted by the volunteers individually
in three separate online sessions presented one week apart.
In the illusory correlation task [11] participants were explained that they were going to be
shown faces of people living in two different districts. Each face would be presented in the
computer screen along with a sentence describing a behavior performed by that person. Vol-
unteers were instructed to read the sentences carefully because they would be later asked ques-
tions about the people in each district and their behaviors. The sentences could describe either
desirable (e.g. “. . . visited a sick friend in the hospital”) or undesirable (e.g. “. . . cheated on an
exam”) behaviors, and most of them were adapted and translated into Spanish from [19]. We
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used faces showing neutral emotions from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces image set
[20]. The task consisted of 39 trials. In each trial the face appeared in the center of the screen
with the name of the district, A or B, and the sentence describing the behavior underneath. In
order to facilitate the discrimination between the two districts we made use of two simple
stock drawings of skylines and two different background colors (green or blue). Depending on
the district, one of the two skylines was added to the left of the face and one of the two back-
ground colors was selected accordingly. Two thirds of the faces presented, 26 trials, corre-
sponded to one of the districts, the majority group, and the other third, 13 trials, corresponded
to the other district, the minority group. The distribution of the specific sentences was ran-
domized across participants and districts but a 2.25 to 1 ratio between sentences describing
positive and negative behaviors in each group was always maintained. All in all, 18 positive
and 8 negative sentences appeared in the majority group, whereas 9 positive and 4 negative
sentences appeared in the minority group. The correspondence between the majority and
minority groups and the skyline images, background colors, district names and face photos
were randomized across participants. The participants controlled the pace of the task by press-
ing the spacebar to change from one trial to another.
After the participants had run through all the trials they were asked to respond to two dif-
ferent types of questions: evaluative ratings and frequency estimates. First the volunteers had
to rate in a 1 to 7 Likert-like scale to which extent they thought different adjectives [19] gener-
ally applied to the neighbors in each district. There were four positive (i.e. “honest”, “intelli-
gent”, “popular” and “helpful”) and four negative (i.e. “irresponsible”, “lazy”, “unpleasant” and
“miserable”) adjectives for each district. Then in a final question the volunteers had to express
how many of the total amount of residents in each district presented negative behaviors (e.g.
“You have been presented with 26 sentences corresponding to people from neighborhood A.
Could you estimate how many of those 26 sentences referred to disagreeable attitudes or
behaviors?”).
In the second phase of the study the participants had to respond to a Spanish-translated ver-
sion of the MFQ30 test [21], which assesses the relevance one concedes to five different moral
dimensions. The test consists of 30 items, plus two control questions, with six items corre-
sponding to each foundation. In the first half of the questions participants are asked to respond
how important a given consideration is when deciding if something is right or wrong (e.g.
“Whether or not someone suffered emotionally”). In the second half of the questions volun-
teers are asked to indicate their degree of agreement with given morally relevant statements
(e.g. “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue”). Responses are regis-
tered using a six-point Likert-like scale with higher responses denoting greater moral rele-
vance. Cronbach’s α for the different subscales of the test in our sample were rather low: .42
for Care, .58 for Fairness, .67 for Loyalty, .64 for Authority and .62 for Purity. Reliability analy-
ses of the five subscales showed that eliminating item 28 from the Care subscale (“It can never
be right to kill a human being”) increased its alpha value up to .57. Similarly, removal of item
29, corresponding to the Fairness subscale (“I think it’s morally wrong that rich children
inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing.”), increased its alpha value up to
.67, whereas deleting item 26, corresponding to the Authority subscale (“Men and women
each have different roles to play in society”) improved its alpha value up to .69. Loyalty and
Purity subscales did not benefit from removal of any specific item. Results reported in the fol-
lowing section were obtained analyzing the improved versions of the subscales, however, the
pattern of results is similar to that obtained with the full versions.
In the third phase, we assessed our participant’s political inclinations and gathered sociode-
mographic data. We constructed a 24-item Political Identity questionnaire inspired by the
website “The Political Compass” (http://www.politicalcompass.org). For the sake of coherence
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with the MFQ30 we used a six-point scale, where six indicated conservative views, instead of
the four-point scale used in the original website. The questions covered different topics includ-
ing civil liberties, immigration, gender roles, abortion, adoption by same-sex couples, religion
at schools, private health care and education services, tax distribution or free market (the full
scale is provided as supporting information, S1 File). Reliability estimates for the questionnaire
were acceptable (α = .85). Questions regarding age and gender were also included in the final
questionnaire.
Results
The results of the study are available through the Universitat de Barcelona Digital Repository
and were analyzed by means of SPSS 23. We first analyzed the results of the illusory correlation
task. We measured our participants’ attitudes, evaluative ratings, towards the majority and
minority groups subtracting the mean ratings corresponding to the negative adjectives from
the mean ratings obtained in response to the positive ones. In our final measure, thus, differen-
tials above zero indicate overall positive evaluations whereas differentials below zero show
overall negative evaluations (a summary of our results is provided in Table 1). The other
dependent variable in this task was the perceived frequencies of negative behaviors in each
group, which were converted to percentages for the analysis. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
showed that these dependent variables were not distributed normally (ps<=.03) so we used
non-parametric tests to conduct the following analyses. The comparison between the subjec-
tive differentials corresponding to the minority and majority groups showed that attitudes
towards the majority group were more positive than those corresponding to the minority
group (z = -4.846, p<.001, r = 0.22). Besides, participants reported significantly higher per-
centages of negative behaviors in the minority compared to the majority group (z = -5.68,
p<.001, r = 0.26).
Second, we analyzed the results of the MFQ30 questionnaire and we checked whether the
association between moral conceptions and political ideology was replicated in our sample.
The participants scored relatively high in the two individualizing foundations of the MFQ30
(Care: mean = 4.72, SD = 0.61; Fairness: mean = 5.07. SD = 0.55), compared to the lower scores
observed in response to the three binding foundations (Loyalty: mean = 3.25, SD = 0.72;
Authority: mean = 3.31, SD = 0.78; Purity: mean = 2.58, SD = 0.7). A correlation analysis
showed that the three binding foundations were significantly associated with the scores in the
political identity questionnaire (see Table 2).
Finally, we explored the relation between the results observed in the illusory correlation
task and the scores obtained in the moral foundations questionnaire. We started by






Difference 1.58(1.73) 0.68(1.65) 0.9(2.82)
Frequency Estimatesb
Negative 43.64(16.15) 52.05(15.18) 8.41(22.58)
a scores in 1–7 scale;
b percentages
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185758.t001
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summarizing the evaluative ratings of our participants in the illusory correlation task. We cal-
culated a new variable subtracting the differential adjective ratings corresponding to the
minority group from those of the majority group (see the Difference column in Table 1). Val-
ues over zero in this measure indicate overall preference for the majority group, whereas values
below zero indicate overall preference for the minority group. We also summarized the
frequency estimates subtracting the percentages of undesirable behaviors attributed to the
majority group from those of the minority group. Values denote the percentage of negative
behaviors attributed to the minority group compared to the majority group. A correlation
analysis including the scores in the moral foundations and the frequency and evaluative judg-
ments of the illusory correlation task showed no significant relation between any specific
individualizing moral foundations and the illusory correlation effects (see Table 3). On the
contrary, we observed significant associations between illusory correlation effects and binding
foundations. Specifically, Loyalty positively correlated with the frequency estimates (p = .003),
an effect that survived Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Finally, the results of
the political identity questionnaire did not correlate with the frequency or subjective ratings
obtained in the illusory correlation task.
Additionally, we conducted two separate regression analyses in order to state whether any
of the specific moral dimensions significantly predicted the evaluative and frequency estimates
provided in the illusory correlation task. The first regression analysis showed that none of the
five moral foundations appeared to be a significant predictor of the subjective preference for
the majority group (all ps>.287). In contrast, the second analysis pointed out Loyalty as the
only significant predictor of differential frequency estimations (β = .220, t = 2.622, p = .009).
Participants who endorsed the Loyalty foundation to a greater extent estimated larger percent-
ages of negative behaviors in the minority compared to the majority group. None of the other
moral dimensions showed a significant effect (ps>.565) over this dependent variable. Finally,
Table 2. Correlation indexes (ρ) between moral foundations and political identity questionnaires.
Care Fairness Loyalty Authority Purity
PI .023 -.106 .425*** .329*** .411***
Care .481*** .300*** .283*** .176**






Indiv.: Individualizing moral foundations average; Bind.: Binding moral foundations average; PI: Political Identity
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185758.t002
Table 3. Correlation indexes (ρ) between Illusory correlation estimates and scores in the moral foundations questionnaire.
Care Fairness Loyalty Authority Purity PI
Subj. .034 .001 .111 .120 .075 .011
Freq. .003 -.013 .192** .104 .08 .099
* p<.05;
** p<.01
Subj.: Differential of the subjective Ratings; Freq.: Differential of the frequency estimates; PI: Political Identity
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185758.t003
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a regression analysis including only Loyalty and political identity scores as predictors showed
significant effects of the former (Loyalty: β = .183, t = 2.603, p = .01) but not the latter (political
identity: β = .021, t = 0.298, p = .766) over frequency estimations.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore the relationship between basic cognitive processes and
moral intuitions through the assessment of the possible association between illusory correla-
tion effects and endorsement of different moral dimensions. The results of our illusory correla-
tion task replicated the classic findings [11,12], as the participants developed more negative
attitudes towards the members of the minority group and tended to associate it to higher fre-
quencies of negative behaviors, in spite of equal proportions of desirable-to-undesirable behav-
iors in the majority and minority groups. On the other hand, the second phase of the study
confirmed the relation between moral foundations and ideology found in previous studies [2].
As anticipated, more conservative participants rated binding foundations as more relevant
than more liberal ones, hence presenting less difference between those two moral dimension
clusters.
Conjoint analyses of the results of the two first phases of the study pointed out a significant
relation between some of the illusory correlation effects and specific binding foundations
whereas no significant association between individualizing moral foundations and the cogni-
tive bias were observed. Crucially, frequency estimates from the illusory correlation task were
significantly predicted by Loyalty scores.
Previous studies have shown that, compared to liberals, conservatives display more pro-
nounced selective attention for negative stimuli [22–24]. This tendency has been proposed as a
possible cause of the predisposition of conservatives to develop stronger associations between
minorities and negative behaviors in the illusory correlation task [16]. However, it remains
unclear why this negativity bias specifically affects the minority group. If conservatives tend to
pay more attention to negative stimuli then they should equally focus their attention at unde-
sirable behaviors in the two groups. This would lead them to produce more negative estimates
in relation to both groups, instead of generating a stronger association between the minority
group and undesirable behaviors. Hence, a mechanism that explains the differential attribution
of negative estimates to the minority is still needed.
The specific association between the Loyalty moral foundation and illusory correlation
observed in the frequency estimates of our participants offers a new perspective on this issue.
Loyalty-related moral concerns imply a preference for in-group over out-group members.
Previous studies exploring the influence of group membership on the formation of the illu-
sory correlation effect have shown that participants who are assigned to one of the groups
prior to the task tend to favor their in-group in the frequency and, to a lesser extent, in the
evaluative judgments [25,26]. We hypothesize that the degree of identification with each of
the two groups could play a critical role in the relation between illusory correlation and ideol-
ogy. Conservatives, who typically obtain higher Loyalty scores than liberals, have been shown
to display less need for uniqueness [27], what has been directly associated to an increased ten-
dency to endorse the majority viewpoints [28]. In our study, participants who more strongly
endorsed Loyalty-related values displayed a tendency to overestimate the differences between
percentages of negative behaviors in the minority, compared to the majority, group. Follow-
ing previous research on the in-group bias [25,26] a tendency to over-identify with the major-
ity group by volunteers with high Loyalty scores could potentially explain this observation.
This interpretation is tentative but further studies could be conducted to explore its plausibil-
ity. From this perspective, we anticipate that when presented with situations in which
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negative behaviors are more frequent and, therefore, an illusory correlation favoring the
minority is expected, the conservatives’ identification with the majority should moderate the
effect. That is, their motivation to favor the majority group would make, in this case, the illu-
sory correlation weaker.
In contrast with the results observed in previous studies [16,17], scores obtained in the
political identity questionnaire did not correlate with illusory correlation effects. A potential
explanation to these differences could be related to the way in which political ideology has
been measured in the different studies. Castelli and Carraro [16] based their assessment on
social issues which are usually rejected by conservatives, such as gay marriage or medically
assisted procreation. As already noted by these authors (pp. 1015), in that kind of measure
conservatism is confounded with avoidance motivations which could be the real source of the
observed effects. In this sense, the inclusion of topics typically favored by conservatives such as
private health care or tax reduction in our political identity questionnaire makes it difficult to
directly compare the two studies. Furthermore, the fact that issues like the ones we just men-
tioned refer to economic, and not social, conservatism also adds to the idea that our PI test
and the mainly social questions used by Castelli and Carraro [16] might be qualitatively differ-
ent measures. Although usually associated with each other, social and economic conservatism
are known to be differentially related to specific attitudes [29] or moral preferences [30]. The
inclusion of economic issues in our questionnaire might have undermined its sensitivity to
assess social conservatism, what could explain the lack of effects observed in our data in com-
parison to previous studies.
In sum, our results contribute to the understanding of which specific components of the
conservative values are related to the sensitivity to develop illusory correlations, which could
be taking part in the development of prejudices against social minorities. As predicted by our
initial hypothesis, the Loyalty moral foundation played a crucial role in this association, point-
ing out the moral system as a useful framework to explore the complex interaction between
basic cognitive processes and political ideology, and providing a more fine-grained tool than
the liberal-conservative distinction.
The correlational nature of our study does not enable causal inferences so it is not possible
for us to establish the direction of the relationship between cognitive processes and moral intu-
itions. However, we reckon this association might be driven by complex bidirectional influ-
ences which could be explored by means of further studies implementing experimental
manipulations of these variables. For instance, if endorsement of Loyalty influences illusory
correlation, then creating contexts that emphasize Loyalty-related concerns should enhance
the illusory correlation effects. Additionally, longitudinal studies measuring both moral incli-
nations and cognitive effects over time could shed some light on the developmental course of
this association.
A potential limitation of this study is that our participants were quite homogeneous
regarding their moral opinions, generally reflecting high endorsement of individualizing
foundations and intermediate endorsement of binding foundations. New studies conducted
with more heterogeneous samples, and thus, offering more variability in relation to moral
intuitions could yield stronger results, and help clarifying the exact role of the different foun-
dations in the relationship between moral concerns and basic cognitive processes like illusory
correlation.
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